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Abstract
We examine prospects for a monetary union in the East African
Community (EAC) by developing a stylized model of policymakers
decision problem that allows for uncertain benets derived from mon-
etary, nancial and scal stability, and then calibrating the model for
the EAC for the period 20032010. When policymakers properly al-
low for uncertainty, none of the countries wants to pursue a monetary
union based on either monetary or nancial stability grounds, and
only Rwanda might favor it on scal stability grounds; we argue that
robust institutional arrangements assuring substantial improvements
in monetary, nancial and scal stability are needed to compensate.
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1 Introduction
The East African Community (EAC), currently consisting of Burundi, Kenya,
Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, has been engaged in an ambitious integra-
tion process since its o¢ cial relaunch in 2000. A customs union was set up in
2005 which became fully operational in 2010, a common market project was
initiated in 2010 which is scheduled to be completed by 2015, and the EAC
member countries are also in the process of further moving towards establish-
ing a monetary union as well. Negotiations of monetary union protocols were
initiated in January 2011 (EAC 2011) and are currently anticipated to be con-
cluded by the end of 2012, making way for discussions of suitable roadmaps
for a possible transition to a single currency in the region (Rusuhuzwa &
Masson 2012). Our paper aims to contribute to this debate by highlighting
several important issues that have not been previously focussed on in the
academic literature on the subject.
While there is a fair number of studies examining the feasibility or desir-
ability of monetary unions in Africa more generally (see e.g. Debrun et al.
2011 for a survey), the literature focussing on the EAC in particular is rela-
tively small for the time being. Most of the research focussing on the EAC
examines the potential for a monetary union in the light of the Optimal
Currency Area (OCA) approach which has its origins in the seminal work of
Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and Kenen (1969). Mkenda (2001), using
data for varying periods up to 1998, examines the three original EAC mem-
ber countries, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, and nds some support that
they constitute an OCA. Buigut & Valev (2005), on the other hand, consider
this question for all ve current EAC member countries using data for the
period 19702001, with results that are rather unsupportive of these coun-
tries forming an OCA. In a similar spirit, Buigut (2011) focusses on the state
of convergence across several macro measures over the period 19972008 for
the ve EAC members, whereas Kishor & Ssozi (2011) examine their degree
of business cycle synchronization over the period 19702007; both similarly
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conclude that the evidence for these countries representing an OCA is weak.
A di¤erent methodological approach is pursued in the related but com-
plimentary papers of Buigut & Valev (2009) and Debrun et al. (2011). They
aim to model potential benets as well as costs associated with a monetary
union by focussing on the reduction in ination bias (in a Barro & Gordon
1983b sense) achievable through being in a monetary union. Calibrating
their model, which allows for random supply shocks to output and stochastic
preferences for output stimulation, to EAC data for the period 19902004,
Buigut & Valev (2009) nd that Uganda and Tanzania would benet from a
monetary union whereas the other countries would lose from it. Debrun et al.
(2011), whose model allows for the setting of tax and seigniorage revenues
to achieve optimal productive expenditure and its interaction with stabiliz-
ing monetary policy reactions to shocks, nd using data covering the period
19902008 that Burundi and Kenya would benet most from a monetary
union in the EAC, whereas Tanzania would lose from joining it.
The methodological approach used in the present paper to assess whether
the EAC is "ready" for a monetary union is related to the previous two pa-
pers, in that it builds on work in Strobel (2005, 2007) which also examine
countrieswillingness to join a monetary union when a time inconsistency
problem in monetary policymaking causes an ination bias to persist, but
stress the importance of taking the real option associated with such mone-
tary regime changes into account. The papers argue that, when the future
evolution of policymakersination preferences is uncertain in such a context,
countries might nd it benecial to hold back on joining a wider monetary
union due to their reluctance to commit to a largely irreversible decision
that might later prove less advantageous than initially thought. This value
of waiting, stemming from the real options nature of the decision problem, is
well-known from the literature on irreversible investment under uncertainty,
can generally be substantial and needs to be properly accounted for.1
1See e.g. McDonald/Siegel (1986) and Dixit/Pindyck (1994).
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In order to highlight the importance of the role of uncertainty in poli-
cymakersdecision making in this respect, we develop a stylized model of
policymakersdecision problem that allows for the stochastic nature of three
key areas of relevance in the decision of whether or not to join a monetary
union: monetary, nancial and scal stability. In addition to the monetary
stability aspect that has so far been center stage in this context, the recent
developments in the euro zone have provided ample proof that both nan-
cial and scal stability aspects can also have a tremendous impact on the
functioning and even viability of a monetary union, even if no prior informal
arrangements or even explicit institutional structures regarding the sharing
of nancial and scal risk exist in the region constituting the monetary union.
Deriving the trigger values of monetary, nancial and scal stability measures
which determine whether or not policymakers nd it benecial to exercise
the real option of engaging in the monetary union, we show that when pol-
icymakers properly account for the uncertainty regarding the evolution of
the monetary, nancial and scal stability measures considered, they might
prove quite reluctant to go ahead with participation in a monetary union
unless compensated for by potential other factors (such as institutional im-
provements or more transactional benets), as the net benets derived from
being in the monetary union might later prove less advantageous than ini-
tially thought.
We then calibrate our model for the EAC, using annual data for the pe-
riod 2003 to 2010, for various proxies of our respective monetary, nancial
and scal stability measures. Two key results emerge from our calibrations:
rstly, the choice of proxies we consider for our monetary, nancial and scal
stability measures matters for whether or not policymakers nd joining a
monetary union benecial for their particular country. Secondly, and more
importantly, however, allowing for the impact of uncertainty surrounding
the evolution of these measures of monetary, nancial and scal stability
generally makes policymakers signicantly less eager to engage in a mone-
4
tary union, unless compensated for by su¢ cient degrees of other benets,
such as of a transactional nature, or more importantly in our view, institu-
tional improvements over existing national arrangements. When policymak-
ers properly allow for the role of uncertainty in this context, we conclude
that none of the countries wants to engage in a monetary union based on ei-
ther monetary or nancial stability considerations unless compensated for by
signicant relative levels of additional benets, requiring in our view credible
and robust institutional arrangements at the monetary union level assuring
substantial improvements in monetary and nancial stability. When looking
at the scal stability aspect, all countries except possibly Rwanda would be
reluctant to join the monetary union from this perspective when uncertainty
is taken into account, unless compensated for by a su¢ cient relative degree of
additional benets, again asking for a sound institutional structure assuring
scal stability in the monetary union.
Section 2 now provides some background for the EAC countries; Section
3 develops our model; Section 4 describes our calibration approach; Section
5 presents and discusses our results; and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Political, economic and institutional back-
ground
The roots of the East African Community (EAC) go back to the colonial pe-
riod when a customs union between Kenya and Uganda was signed in 1917,
which was later joined by Tanzania (called at that time Tanganyika) in 1927.
The rst treaty establishing the EAC was signed in 1967; however, it col-
lapsed a decade later in 1977 and was o¢ cially dissolved in 1983. Several
reasons for the collapse of the old EAC have been put forward (Mugomba
1978, Hazlewood 1979). Firstly, there was a sentiment that the common
market was more benecial to Kenya than to Tanzania and Uganda. This
can be explained by di¤erences in the level of industrialization, with a more
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developed industrial sector in Kenya than in the two other countries. Sec-
ondly, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda had important ideological and domestic
political di¤erences. Kenya was committed to capitalism, but internal polit-
ical tensions and corruption had led to economic stagnation. On the other
hand, Tanzania and Uganda pursued forms of African socialism (Ujamaa in
Tanzania and Common Mans Charter in Uganda).
The region went through several political and economic shocks after the
collapse of the initial EAC. However, the three countries have lately followed
broadly similar policies by adopting capitalism, without any central economic
coordination. In 1999, the three original partner states Kenya, Uganda and
Tanzania ratied the treaty reviving the EAC, which came into force in
July 2000.2 In July 2007, two more countries, Burundi and Rwanda became
o¢ cially full members of the EAC, giving it its current shape of ve partner
states. The integration process of the EAC is embedded in Article 5(2)
of its Treaty, stipulating that the Partner States undertake to establish
among themselves [...] a Customs Union, a Common Market, subsequently
a Monetary Union and ultimately a Political Federation. The rst of these
four steps has been completed: the customs union was signed in March 2004,
was launched in 2005 and became fully operational in 2010. The common
market project was initiated in 2010 and is scheduled to be completed by
2015; the completion of these rst two steps will allow the free movement of
goods, labour, services and capital among the ve member countries. The
next step in this integration process is the move towards a monetary union,
with negotiations of monetary union protocols having started in January
2011 which are currently anticipated to be concluded by the end of 2012.3
Before looking more closely at the decision of individual EAC member
countries of whether joining a monetary union based on monetary, nancial
2The treaty laying down the foundations of the current EAC can be found at
<http://www.eac.int/treaty/index.php>.
3As for a political federation, preparations are at early stages and no precise timetable
has yet been given.
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and scal stability considerations may be benecial, it is helpful to look at
some more general indicators of the economic structure, the development of
the nancial system and the institutional environment of these countries.
All EAC countries have pursued programs to restructure their economies
over the last two decades, with the help of the International Monetary Fund
and the World Bank. Uganda and Rwanda were the most successful reform-
ers (public sector reforms, trade liberalization, market and price reforms)
leading to an economic expansion. These two countries display the highest
average GDP growth rate in the EAC over the period 2000-2010 (see Ta-
ble 1) accompanied by an increase of GDP per capita of 58% for Rwanda
and 47% for Uganda (see Figure 1). This means that those two countries
may ultimately catch up with Kenya which has the highest GDP per capita.
Uganda and Rwanda have also had success in reducing their ination rates
to comparatively low levels of 2.3% and 4%, respectively, in 2010 (see Table
1). They furthermore, together with Tanzania, have the lowest budget decit
and domestic public debt (as percentage of GDP) on average over the last
decade (see Table 2).
Kenya has been a¤ected by government mismanagement, counterpro-
ductive economic policies and corruption for decades (Heritage Foundation
2012). Political pressures lead to several breakdowns of scal and monetary
discipline, and Kenya has on average the highest domestic public debt to
GDP ratio and a high ination rate over the period 2000-2010. Tanzania,
a historically state-led economy, made progress in fostering growth over the
past decade with a GDP per capita in 2010 close to Kenyas (see Table 1 and
Figure 1), through implementing a large program of reforms to become more
market-based. Amongst the EAC countries, Burundi is the least performing
one with a GDP per capita 25% of the ones of Kenya and Tanzania, and 35%
of those of Uganda and Rwanda. According to Heritage Foundation (2012),
the repressive policy environment in Burundi makes it di¢ cult for the private
sector to create employment and sustained economic growth. Despite these
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di¤erences, the EAC countries are fairly similar when looking at the sectoral
composition of GDP (see Table 1). All are heavily dependent on agriculture,
with exports being largely resource-based.
World Development Indicators on government e¤ectiveness, control of
corruption, political stability, rule of law and regulatory quality further show
that there are strong disparities in terms of institutional environment be-
tween EAC countries (see Figures 2 to 6). Such di¤erences can possibly go a
long way towards explaining the di¤erent economic performances observed.
Rwanda shows the highest degree of improvement over the last decade in
terms of quality of public services, credibility of government policies, control
of corruption and condence in the rules of society.
Important di¤erences across the EAC can furthermore be observed re-
garding the size and the development of the nancial sector. While EAC
nancial systems are all concentrated in commercial banking and very small
in relation to the economy, the level of development of capital markets varies
greatly. Kenya has a relatively well-developed nancial sector, Tanzania and
Uganda have small stock exchanges and Burundi and Rwanda do not have a
stock market at all (see Table 3). The market capitalization of the 55 listed
Kenyan companies stands at about 35% of GDP, whereas that of the 11 Tan-
zanian and the 8 Ugandan ones is about 27% and 5.5%, respectively. The
development of the securities market in the EAC countries is constrained by
the small number of private rms with the capacity to raise funds through
the capital markets. Similarly, the demand for nancial products is also
relatively low.
The nancial system of all EAC countries is dominated by banks. Large
reforms have been implemented during the last two decades in order to lib-
eralize the banking system, privatize state-owned banks and restructure loss
making banks characterized by a high level of non performing loans (Cihak
& Podpiera 2005, UN Economic Commission for Africa 2008). The expected
positive e¤ects from liberalization in terms of savings mobilization and credit
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allocation were slow to emerge, but one can observe over the last ve years
a sharp acceleration in the domestic credit provided by the banking sec-
tor relative to GDP, apart from for Rwanda (see Figure 7). These reforms
notwithstanding, EAC countries have overall a low level of nancial inter-
mediation and access to nance is a critical issue. As shown in Table 3, less
than 30% of the population in Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda have access
to the formal nancial system, whereas more than 50% of the population in
Rwanda and Tanzania are completely excluded from access to nancial ser-
vices. In Kenya, the development of mobile banking has however increased
the proportion of the population that has access to the formal banking sector
to 40%. Furthermore, bank deposits as a percentage of GDP are less than
35% for Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and Rwanda and just above 50% for
Kenya, well below the levels of some other African countries (e.g. 70% in
South Africa).
This high level of nancial exclusion could be explained by the small
number of banks which operate in the EAC (see Table 3), as well as by the
lack of competition between these banks. Sanya & Gaertner (2012) show that
despite the lack of formal regulatory barriers to entry, there are structural
factors that enable some banks to benet from a degree of monopoly power.
More than two decades after reforms were started, the spread between lending
and deposit rates is still high (above 8%, see Table 3), reecting this lack of
competition. The banking system in Uganda shows the highest bank spread,
but it is also the most robust one with the highest return on assets on average
over the period 2003-2010, the highest capital adequacy and equity ratios,
the lowest non performing loans to gross loans ratio and a relatively high
value of the aggregate Z-score,4 reecting a relatively low level of aggregate
bank insolvency risk (see Table 4). The banking system in Kenya, which is
by far the most developed in the EAC, also displays good performance with
a strong decrease in the non performing loans ratio over the period 2003-
4See Section 4 for details of this measure.
9
2010 and the highest aggregate Z-score, i.e. the lowest degree of aggregate
bank insolvency risk. The banking systems in Burundi and Rwanda, on the
other hand, are the smallest in the EAC and have a relatively high level of
non performing loans. Lastly, there are also important di¤erences in banking
regulation across the EAC as shown in Table 5: there is no explicit deposit
insurance system in Burundi and Rwanda, and there is no harmonization on
activity restrictions and capital adequacy requirements throughout.
Overall, despite tremendous improvements in economic fundamentals in
the EAC countries in the last decade, we still observe a substantial degree
of divergence in these, supplemented with even stronger di¤erences in the
institutional environment in place in these countries.
[Insert Tables 15 and Figures 18]
3 Policymakersstylized decision problem
As our rst step towards examining prospects for a monetary union in the
EAC, we now develop a stylized model of policymakersdecision problem
regarding whether or not to join a monetary union that allows for the un-
certainty arising in three key areas of importance in this context. Policy-
makers are assumed to be concerned with monetary (m), nancial (f) as
well as scal (g) stability, in their own countries (c) or the monetary union
(u) if they decide to participate in it. They face instantaneous benet rates
sit = 

sit, where s = m; f; g and i = c; u, that are concave, with concavity
parameter 0 <   1, in monetary, nancial and scal stability measures
mit; fit; git  0 which are stochastic and follow geometric Brownian mo-
tions5
dsit = sisitdzsit ; s = m; f; g ; i = c; u (1)
5Strobel (2009) uses a related but less general framework limited to strictly linear
benet/loss functions.
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where si > 0, dzsit = "sit
p
dt are increments of Wiener processes with "sit 
NID(0; 1), and Et(dzsctdzsut) = sdt with s the coe¢ cient of correlation
between the processes zsit (and  1  s < 1).
The expected present discounted value of benets associated with mone-
tary, nancial or scal stability is then6
Bsit = Et
Z 1
t
sie
 ( t)d =
sit
  1
2
2si (   1)
; s = m; f; g (2)
where  > 0 is the (possibly subjective) discount rate, and   1
2
2si (   1) >
0 represents a natural convergence condition.
The decision of a country c on whether or not to participate in the mone-
tary union u, on monetary, nancial or scal stability grounds,7 then involves
solving the Bellman equation for the optimal stopping problem8
F (Bsu; Bsc) = max

(1 + s)Bsu  Bsc ; 1
dt
E[dF (Bsu; Bsc)]

; s = m; f; g
(3)
where F (Bsu; Bsc) is the value to country c of the option of participating
in the monetary union u, and (1 + s)Bsu   Bsc is the expected discounted
benet from improved monetary, nancial or scal stability of such a par-
ticipation, with all potential other benets9 captured by the proportionality
factor s  0. Note that this implicitly assumes that participating in a
monetary union is an irreversible process, so that the costs of possibly later
leaving it, both reputational and institutional, are considered prohibitively
high.10 We can then obtain
6See e.g. Dixit (1993, eq. (2.7)).
7As the relative benets associated with monetary, nancial and scal stability are far
from straightforward to quantify jointly, we consider these decision problems separately.
8We drop time subscripts for ease of notation.
9These could e.g. be of a transactional nature or relate to institutional improvements;
for a survey see De Grauwe (2012, ch. 3).
10The option of possible future monetary disintegration could in principle be allowed
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Proposition 1 Country c will want to exercise the option of participating in
the monetary union u, on monetary (m), nancial (f) or scal (g) stability
grounds, if
su
sc
 

su
sc
=
 
+s
 
  1
2
2su (   1)

(1 + s) (+s   1)
 
  1
2
2sc (   1)
! 1 ; s = m; f; g
where +s is the positive root
11 of the characteristic equation
 
2su   2ssusc + 2sc

22s  
 
2(2sc   ssusc) + 2su   2sc

s
+ 2sc(   1)  2 = 0 ; s = m; f; g
and not exercise it otherwise.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Country c thus perceives exercise of the option of participating in the
monetary union u, on monetary, nancial or scal stability grounds, as de-
sirable only when the current value of relative monetary, nancial or scal
stability measure su=sc is greater than (or equal to) its derived trigger value
su=

sc ; intuitively, the lower a countrys monetary, nancial or scal sta-
bility relative to the potential monetary unions, the more it stands to gain
from participating in that union. While su=sc < su=

sc applies, on the
other hand, country c strictly prefers to leave the option of participating in
the monetary union u unexercised and remains outside it for the time being.
Figures 911 numerically illustrate the economic relevance of these re-
sults, graphing the trigger values u=

c derived in Proposition 1 for di¤erent
parameter combinations of standard deviations i, correlation coe¢ cients
for as well, albeit at nontrivial analytical cost. Qualitatively, however, results would be
very similar to the benchmark case considered here as long as the costs associated with
later leaving the monetary union are su¢ ciently high, a scenario vividly illustrated by the
Eurozone crisis debate of 2012.
11While +s can be derived analytically, it is rather unwieldy and not too insightful for
our purposes here.
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, discount rates , concavity parameters  and the proportionality factor
.12 We observe from the nontrivial magnitudes of trigger values arising
that when policymakers properly account for the uncertainty surrounding
the future evolution of the monetary, nancial and scal stability measures
considered, they might prove quite reluctant to go ahead with participation
in a monetary union unless compensated for by potential other benets (cap-
tured by the proportionality factor ), as the associated benets and costs
might later prove less advantageous than initially thought.
[Insert Figures 911]
4 Calibration approach
To calibrate our model for the EAC, we use annual data from the EAC Sta-
tistics database13 as our main source of data. As this data is harmonized
for the ve EAC member countries, data discrepancies that might stem from
di¤erences in denitions or calculations across di¤erent sources are reduced.
The period over which our calibration is carried out is driven by data avail-
ability, and covers the period 2003 to 2010. Some missing data (for 2003
and 2004 for Tanzania and for 2009 for Uganda in particular) was com-
pleted from central bank reports. Our data was furthermore checked against
two other data sources, International Financial Statistics (IFS) and World
Development Indicators (WDI), turning out broadly comparable (with the
exception of Kenya, where the ination rate reported in the EAC database
was comparatively lower for 2006-2009).
We consider various proxies for our monetary, nancial and scal stability
measures. We proxy the monetary stability measure m by two indicators:
the inverse of the (realized) ination rate given by the consumer price index
(CPI), and the inverse of the public domestic debt to GDP ratio. These
12These are consistent with Section 4s calibration.
13This is available at <http://www.eac.int/statistics/index.php>.
13
measures aim to capture the potential ination bias resulting when govern-
ments try to stimulate output in the short run (the expectational Phillips
curve argument) or to reduce the real value of outstanding public (domestic)
debt (the governmental revenue motive).14 We nd non-trivial ranges of the
standard deviations mc used in our calibrations that go from 0.09 to 1.01,
and correlation coe¢ cients m that range between -0.07 and 0.97.
We also consider two proxies for our nancial stability measure f : the
inverse of the bank nonperforming loans to gross loans ratio, one of the
traditional nancial soundness indicators used by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), and aggregate Z-score measures reecting the overall insolvency
risk faced by a countrys banking sector.15 Using aggregate country data
for the banking sector, we construct these aggregate Z-score measures as
Z =
 
ROA+ EQ_TA

=ROA where ROA and EQ_TA are three year rolling
means of the return on assets and the equity to total assets ratio, and ROA
is the three year rolling standard deviation of the return on assets.16 We
observe values of the standard deviations fc used in our calibrations that
range from 0.11 to 0.89, and correlation coe¢ cients f that lie between -0.38
and 0.99.
Lastly, we use the two following proxies for our scal stability measure g:
the inverse of the budget decit (including all grants) to GDP ratio, and the
inverse of the budget decit (excluding all grants) to GDP ratio. The distinc-
tion between the two is relevant as we note from Table 2 that the government
nances of Burundi and Rwanda, in particular, are strongly dependent on
grants. As the level and continuity of such grants can be unpredictable, the
measure excluding all grants is more "structural" in a sense than the one
including them. We nd values of the standard deviations gc used in our
14See e.g. Barro & Gordon (1983a) and Barro (1983), respectively.
15For a survey of di¤erent approaches to constructing such aggregate Z-score measures,
see Strobel (2011).
16We also considered an alternative way of computing the Z-score measure, given by
Z =
 
ROE + 100

=ROE , where ROE is the return on equity (in percent), with similar
results.
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calibrations that go from 0.08 to 0.22, and correlation coe¢ cients g that
range between -0.08 and 0.88.
The potential monetary unions monetary, nancial and scal stability
measures su are then constructed as the arithmetic means of the constituent
countriesproxied values, weighted by domestic credit provided by the bank-
ing sector for the nancial stability proxies, and (constant) GDP for the
monetary and scal stability proxies (these were retrieved from WDI). For
the monetary stability measures, this mimics a bargaining outcome over the
unions monetary policy where individual member countries votes reect
their relative size in the union. For the nancial and scal stability mea-
sures, on the other hand, this approximates nancial and scal risk sharing
arrangements implicitly (or even explicitly) associated with the monetary
union, again allowing for individual member countriesrespective size.
In order to then compute the proxied trigger values of relative monetary,
nancial and scal stability measures su=

sc given by Proposition 1, we de-
rive the standard unbiased estimates17 of si and s by calculating the stan-
dard deviations and correlation coe¢ cients for the respective transformed
series ln (t=t 1) for each of our proxies. In line with discount rates applied
by the World Bank and African Development Bank, we assume a (social)
discount rate of  = 12% (see e.g. Harrison 2010), consistent with a sub-
stantial amount of myopia attached to policymakers decision making.18 We
furthermore set the concavity parameter in policymakers benet functions
at  = 0:5, reecting the plausible assumption that the benets policymakers
derive from increased monetary, nancial or scal stability exhibit diminish-
ing marginal returns.19 An interesting benchmark case in our calibrations is
going to be the decision problem for a policymaker that ignores the impor-
tance of uncertainty in their decision making process: it is straightforward
17See e.g. Ingersoll (1987, p. 358).
18See e.g. Strobel (2007, fn. 16); we also used alternative discount rates of 10 and 11%,
with similar results.
19We also used  = 1 in our calibrations, with similar results.
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to see that the trigger value corresponding to the one given in Proposition 1
would then simply be su=

sc = 1 in this case.
5 Results and discussion
We present the results from our calibrations in Tables 68, examining policy-
makerswillingness to participate in a monetary union on monetary, nancial
and scal stability grounds, respectively. Our analysis is carried out rst con-
sidering a monetary union consisting of all ve current member countries of
the EAC; we then alternatively examine whether the results di¤er when we
restrict the analysis to the three original member countries that may have
deeper ties by comparison. This will allow us to determine whether the ad-
dition of Burundi and Rwanda in 2007 to the EAC made the move towards
a monetary union more di¢ cult to achieve or not. In each case, we examine
whether countries would be willing to participate in a given monetary union
under two scenarios: rstly, where policymakers abstract from the role of
uncertainty,20 and then, secondly, where they do properly account for the
importance of uncertainty in the decision problem they face, in line with
Proposition 1. By comparing the respective trigger values su=

sc with the
actual values su=sc of each criterion/proxy in the year 2010 (our reference
period), we then explicitly answer the question whether each country would
currently nd participating in the given monetary union advantageous or
not. Where they would prefer to stay outside a given monetary union for the
time being, we further calculate the minimum level of relative other benets
s associated with being in a monetary union that would nevertheless make
it worthwhile for them to participate in the monetary union after all.21
The results from our calibration considering countrieswillingness to par-
20Implying a trigger value of 

su
sc
= 1, as noted in Section 4.
21Note that s is thus implicitly dened by su=sc = 
+s
 
  122su (   1)

=
 
(1 + s) (
+
s   1)
 
  122sc (   1)
 1
 from Proposi-
tion 1, or s = sc=su   1 for the certainty case.
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ticipate in a monetary union on monetary stability grounds are presented in
Table 6. When policymakers ignore the role of uncertainty in the decision of
whether or not to join a monetary union consisting of all EAC countries, we
observe that for Proxy 1 (inverse of realized ination) Burundi and Tanza-
nia, and for Proxy 2 (inverse of public domestic debt to GDP) additionally
Kenya, are in favor of entering into such a union. The other countries are
only willing to go ahead with such a move when the other benets associated
with a monetary union are of a su¢ cient magnitude, as expressed by the level
of . Considering Proxy 1, Rwanda is the most reluctant (has the highest
level of ), whereas for Proxy 2 this place is taken by Uganda. This is in
line with our observation in Section 2 that both Rwanda and Uganda had
substantial success in reforming their economies in the last decade. When
policymakers do properly account for the role of uncertainty in this decision
problem, by allowing for the value of the real option introduced by the un-
certainty surrounding the benets from a potential monetary union (driven
by the variability in our monetary stability measures observed in Tables 1
and 2), only Burundi and Kenya, and that exclusively for Proxy 2, still want
to go ahead with the monetary union. The other three countries for Proxy
2, and all ve EAC member countries when focussing on Proxy 1, would
now be reluctant to join, with the countries requiring the highest, and now
substantially larger, relative levels of other compensating benets from such
a monetary union still being Rwanda when considering Proxy 1, and Uganda
when focussing on Proxy 2. Interestingly, we can further note that consider-
ing only a monetary union consisting of the original EAC member countries
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda does not change those countriesincentives to
join such a narrower monetary union compared to the larger ve country
union, irrespective of whether policymakers properly account for the role of
uncertainty in their decision making or not.
The importance of allowing for the role of uncertainty in policymakers
decision making also shows when we examine countrieswillingness to par-
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ticipate in a monetary union based on nancial stability motives, the results
of which are presented in Table 7. When uncertainty is abstracted from,
almost all countries nd participation in a monetary union consisting of all
ve EAC countries benecial, with the exception of Uganda when consider-
ing Proxy 1 (inverse of nonperforming loans to gross loans), and Kenya when
examining Proxy 2 (aggregate Z-score). Again this is consistent with our
discussion in Section 2 which showed that Kenya and Uganda have the most
robust banking systems amongst the group of EAC countries. When uncer-
tainty regarding the evolution of our nancial stability measures (see Table
4) is properly accounted for in policymakersdecision problem, Kenya also
loses interest in joining the monetary union based on Proxy 1, with Uganda
becoming even more strongly opposed to such a move (as shown by its high
level of ). When considering Proxy 2, however, none of the countries want
to move towards the monetary union unless su¢ ciently compensated by the
respective relative other benets associated with it, with Uganda again be-
ing the most demanding in this sense (having the highest level ), followed
closely by Tanzania. Similarly to the results obtained for the monetary sta-
bility criteria above, countries incentives of joining a narrower monetary
union consisting of only the original EAC member countries are unchanged
compared to those associated with joining the larger one, again irrespective
of whether uncertainty is allowed for in policymakers decision making or not.
A further illustration of how important the consideration of uncertainty
is in this context is given when we lastly examine countrieswillingness to
participate in a monetary union on scal stability grounds (Table 8). Results
for the no uncertainty case are somewhat mixed, providing an exactly op-
posing picture of whether or not countries want to join the monetary union
consisting of all ve EAC member countries depending on whether Proxy 1
(inverse of budget decit inc. grants to GDP), or Proxy 2 (inverse of budget
decit excl. grants to GDP) is used. This stresses, in a sense, the impor-
tance of being careful as to which measure to use in this context; as the latter
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one clearly gives a more "structural" picture of a countrys scal position,
we would favor concentrating on the second one. On this basis, Kenya and
Uganda would be opposed to the monetary union on scal stability grounds,
with the other countries nding it benecial. These results change dramat-
ically, though, once we consider that policymakers do allow for the role of
uncertainty in the scal stability measures (see Table 2), in that no coun-
try wants to join the wider monetary union when considering Proxy 1 in
this case. Only Rwanda nds the move towards the monetary union bene-
cial when focussing on Proxy 2, with the remaining countries opposed and
Uganda again showing the highest level of reticence in this scenario. As for
the previous two stability motives considered, countriesdecisions of whether
or not to join the monetary union are unchanged when only concentrating
on the three original EAC member countries, again whether uncertainty is
properly accounted for or not.
Overall, we take away two key results from our calibrations: rstly, the
choice of proxy for our monetary, nancial and scal stability measures is
not innocuous and does matter; secondly, and more importantly, allowing
for the role of uncertainty in measures of monetary, nancial and scal sta-
bility generally makes policymakerssignicantly less eager to engage in a
monetary union unless compensated for by su¢ cient degrees of other ben-
ets, such as transactional benets or, more importantly in our view, in-
stitutional improvements. Looking at the monetary stability aspect of our
calibrations, and focussing on the arguably more solid, as direct, measure
of (realized) ination, none of the countries wants to engage in a monetary
union in the uncertainty scenario unless compensated for by signicant rel-
ative levels of additional benets  ranging between 0.52 (for Tanzania)
and 2.16 (for Rwanda). Given the evident current political will to move
ahead with a monetary union in the EAC, this in our view calls for a suf-
ciently robust, credible institutional structure assuring monetary stability
in the monetary union beyond what individual central banks are able to
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achieve at the moment. Turning to the nancial stability aspect of the ques-
tion, and concentrating on the aggregate Z-score measure which arguably
is more robust than the one relying on often more unreliable non perform-
ing loans data, we observe a similar picture: all countries are unwilling to
engage in the monetary union when uncertainty is taken into account, un-
less compensated for by substantial relative levels of additional benets 
in the range of 0.43 (for Rwanda) and 2.78 (for Uganda). Again, this calls
for considerable improvements in the institutional arrangements regarding
nancial stability in the monetary union area, and given the euro zone coun-
triesrecent experience, preferably in a formalized arrangement that is set
out right from the start of the monetary union, rather than as more informal
ad hoc structures. Lastly, a similar picture again evolves when looking at
the scal stability aspect examined, where we prefer to focus on the budget
decit (excl. grants) measure as the one most closely reecting the under-
lying, structural scal position in a country. All countries except possibly
Rwanda would be reluctant to join the monetary union from a scal stability
perspective when uncertainty is taken into account, unless compensated for
by relative levels of additional benets  ranging from 0.02 (for Burundi)
and 0.26 (for Uganda). Compared to the monetary and nancial criteria,
these additional required relative benets are fairly small, suggesting that a
reasonable amount of credible institutional structure assuring scal stability
in the monetary union area should su¢ ce to satisfy all potential member
countries in this respect.
[Insert Tables 68]
6 Conclusion
Our paper aims to contribute to the ongoing academic debate accompanying
the current political drive towards the establishment of a monetary union in
the East African Community (EAC). Rather than focus more narrowly on the
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discussion of convergence issues for di¤erent sets of economic criteria, we use
a somewhat di¤erent approach that particularly highlights the importance
of the role of uncertainty in policymakersdecision making in this context.
To this end, we develop a stylized model of policymakersdecision problem
that allows for the stochastic nature of monetary, nancial and scal stability
as three key areas of relevance for the decision to join a monetary union. In
addition to the more common monetary stability aspect, the recent upheaval
in the euro zone motivates us to also focus on nancial and scal stability
in this context. By characterizing the real option implicit in a policymakers
decision of whether or not to join the monetary union, we derive the trigger
values of monetary, nancial and scal stability measures which drive whether
or not policymakers nd it benecial to engage in the monetary union at the
moment. We can show that when policymakers properly account for the
uncertainty regarding the evolution of these monetary, nancial and scal
stability measures, they might show a substantial degree of reluctance to
participate in the monetary union unless compensated for by potential other
factors, such as institutional improvements or more standard transactional
benets.
Calibrating our model for the EAC using annual data for the period 2003
to 2010, for various proxies of our respective monetary, nancial and scal
stability measures, we then conclude that when policymakers properly allow
for the uncertainty surrounding the evolution of these measures, none of the
countries wants to engage in a monetary union based on either monetary
or nancial stability grounds, and only Rwanda might want to engage in
it on scal stability grounds, unless compensated for by signicant relative
levels of additional benets associated with being in the monetary union.
Particularly in the context of the current dramatic euro zone experience, this
highlights the importance of agreeing and setting up, from the very start,
credible and robust institutional arrangements at the monetary union level
assuring substantial improvements in monetary, nancial and scal stability
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for the countries participating in the monetary union. In our mind this is a
key lesson: as we saw in the European case, when the political will to form a
monetary union is there, economistsviews on whether or not a region forms
an optimum currency area are easily swept aside. Our results, supported
by the experience of the recent turmoil in the euro zone, suggest that the
key to a viable and sustainable monetary union may lie in good institutional
foundations, not only supporting monetary stability as such, but also assuring
wider nancial and scal stability as well.
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A Appendix
Proof. (Proposition 1) For country c, not participating in the monetary
union u for a further instant dt is optimal in the continuation region of the
optimal stopping problem eq. (3), giving the relevant Bellman equation as
F (Bsu; Bsc) =
1
dt
Et[dF (Bsu; Bsc)] ; s = m; f; g (4)
Applying Itos Lemma to eq. (4) and noting that the value function F (Bsu; Bsc)
should be homogeneous of degree 1,22 so that F (Bsu; Bsc) = Bscf(	s) where
	s  Bsu=Bsc, we obtain
 
2su   2ssusc + 2sc

2	2sf
00(	s) +
 
2su   2sc

(   1)	sf 0(	s)
+ 2sc(   1)f(	s)  2f(	s) = 0 ; s = m; f; g (5)
as the di¤erential equation that characterizes the evolution of f(	s) in that
region.
22This adopts the solution strategy in Dixit & Pindyck (1994, p. 210).
25
We solve eq. (5) by standard methods, using the value-matching and
smooth-pasting conditions f(	s) = (1 + s) 	

s   1 and @f(	s)=@	s =
(1 + s) and the boundary condition23 f(0) = 0 ; we thereby obtain 	s =
+s = ((1 + s) (
+
s   1)) where +s is the positive root of the characteristic
equation
 
2su   2ssusc + 2sc

22s  
 
2(2sc   ssusc) + 2su   2sc

s
+ 2sc(   1)  2 = 0 ; s = m; f; g
as the critical (trigger) value 	s. From the denition of 	s it follows that
su=

sc =
 
+s
 
  1
2
2su (   1)

(1 + s) (+s   1)
 
  1
2
2sc (   1)
! 1 ; s = m; f; g
is the trigger value of relative monetary, nancial or scal stability measures
su=sc separating the region in (su; sc) space where country cs option of
participating in the monetary union u remains unexercised (i.e. for su=sc <
su=

sc) from the one where immediate exercise of that option is perceived as
optimal (i.e. for su=sc  su=sc).
23The geometric Brownian motion 	s has an absorbing barrier at zero.
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Figure 1: EAC GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$) 
 
Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators (Edition: April 2012) 
 
 
Figure 2: EAC government effectiveness 
 
Source: World Bank: Worldwide Governance Indicators (2010) 
This indicator captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and 
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and 
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. 
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Figure 3: EAC control of corruption 
 
Source: World Bank: Worldwide Governance Indicators (2010) 
This indicator captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and 
private interests. 
 
 
Figure 4: EAC political stability and absence of violence/terrorism 
 
Source: World Bank: Worldwide Governance Indicators (2010) 
This indicator captures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. 
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Figure 5: EAC rule of law 
 
Source: World Bank: Worldwide Governance Indicators (2010) 
This indicator captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and 
the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
 
 
Figure 6: EAC regulatory quality 
 
Source: World Bank: Worldwide Governance Indicators (2010) 
This indicator captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound 
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
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Figure 7: EAC money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP 
 
Sources: World Bank (2012): World Development Indicators (Edition: April 2012); East African 
Community Statistics (2012). 
 
 
Figure 8: EAC domestic credit provided by banking sector as % of GDP 
 
Sources: World Bank (2012): World Development Indicators (Edition: April 2012). 
 
Figure 9: Trigger value u=

c (for  = 0:5;  = 0:12;  = 0:5;  = 0)
Figure 10: Trigger value u=

c (for u = 0:4; c = 0:5;  = 0:5;  = 0)
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Figure 11: Trigger value u=

c (for u = 0:4; c = 0:5;  = 0:5;  = 0:12)
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Table 1: EAC indicators of economic structure (2000-2010) 
 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Average  
GDP growth rate 
Burundi -0.86 4.45 4.83 5.12 4.50 3.90 2.80 
Kenya 0.60 0.55 5.10 6.32 1.53 5.55 3.81 
Rwanda 8.10 11.00 7.40 9.20 11.20 7.50 7.64 
Tanzania 4.93 7.16 7.83 6.74 7.44 7.04 6.78 
Uganda 3.14 8.73 6.81 10.78 8.71 5.18 7.00 
Agriculture, value added (% of GDP) 
Burundi 40.40 40.53 40.08 na na 30.00 39.24 
Kenya 32.36 29.13 28.04 26.75 25.83 25.18 27.91 
Rwanda 37.19 35.49 38.56 38.44 32.38 33.85 36.43 
Tanzania 33.48 32.46 33.33 30.41 29.71 28.06 31.21 
Uganda 29.38 24.90 22.92 25.59 22.74 24.25 25.51 
Industry, value added (% of GDP) 
Burundi 18.79 18.59 18.92 na na na 19.05 
Kenya 16.92 17.41 18.23 18.50 19.77 19.82 18.39 
Rwanda 13.58 13.92 13.88 13.76 14.84 14.39 13.88 
Tanzania 19.18 21.06 22.35 22.88 23.14 25.48 22.38 
Uganda 22.90 24.36 22.06 24.24 27.40 25.47 24.60 
Services, value added (% of GDP) 
Burundi 40.81 40.87 41.00 na na na 41.71 
Kenya 50.72 53.46 53.73 54.76 54.40 55.00 53.70 
Rwanda 49.23 50.58 47.56 47.81 52.78 51.75 49.69 
Tanzania 47.34 46.48 44.32 46.71 47.15 46.47 46.40 
Uganda 47.72 50.74 55.02 50.17 49.86 50.28 49.89 
Trade (% of GDP) 
Burundi 27.69 28.48 43.49 57.71 na na 39.34 
Kenya 53.31 55.17 59.48 62.73 69.23 65.39 60.88 
Rwanda 34.37 34.32 35.89 36.34 44.62 40.56 37.11 
Tanzania 33.49 37.42 45.72 58.26 63.93 63.84 50.44 
Uganda 32.75 36.28 35.46 43.63 56.26 58.31 43.78 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual % change) 
Burundi 24.32 -1.37 8.30 2.70 24.50 6.50 10.82 
Kenya 9.98 1.96 11.60 6.00 16.20 4.08 8.30 
Rwanda 3.90 1.99 11.90 8.80 15.40 2.30 7.38 
Tanzania 5.92 5.32 4.16 7.30 10.30 5.50 6.42 
Uganda 3.39 -0.29 3.70 7.20 12.00 4.00 5.00 
Sources: World Bank (2012): World Development Indicators (Edition: April 2012); East African 
Community Statistics (2012). 
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Table 2: EAC government finances (2000-2010) 
 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 Average  
Budget (overall) deficit/surplus, excluding grants (% of GDP) 
Burundi -6.25 -12.10 -20.04 -14.50 -13.58 -15.55 -13.89 
Kenya -4.20 -3.70 -9.45 -7.50 -7.27 -8.77 -6.66 
Rwanda -11.10 -11.60 -11.20 -10.50 -10.50 -13.67 -11.33 
Tanzania -4.53 -4.10 -10.19 -8.33 -8.20 -8.91 -7.92 
Uganda -10.90 -12.20 -7.85 -7.10 -4.61 -7.95 -8.16 
Budget (overall) deficit/surplus, including grants (% of GDP) 
Burundi -3.15 -1.32 -5.56 -3.14 -3.09 -2.64 -3.13 
Kenya -1.17 -5.10 -8.19 -6.28 -5.66 -5.27 -5.34 
Rwanda -0.32 -2.50 -0.20 -0.20 0.43 -1.56 -0.85 
Tanzania -1.93 -0.20 -4.51 -2.44 -3.10 -3.35 -2.90 
Uganda -4.60 -2.00 -0.48 -1.91 -1.67 -4.84 -2.56 
Domestic public  debt (% of GDP) 
Burundi 13.33 16.64 27.41 24.35 19.65 23.16 20.76 
Kenya 19.91 25.01 23.19 23.73 21.96 28.29 23.68 
Rwanda 11.67 10.71 8.95 8.80 5.79 6.77 8.78 
Tanzania 10.00 7.48 6.95 9.89 8.64 10.08 8.84 
Uganda 2.83 5.54 3.54 3.60 1.95 2.66 3.36 
Sources: East African Community Statistics (2012); Central banks and National Bureau of Statistics. 
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Table 3: EAC financial development (2010) 
 Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
Access to financial services (%) 
Formal na 40 21 17 28 
Informal na 27 26 27 42 
Excluded entirely na 33 52 56 30 
Number of commercial banks 
Domestic banks 7 31 9 17 8 
Foreign banks 0 12 3 16 14 
Bank deposits (% of GDP) 
 34 51 18 29 23 
Interest rate spread (lending - deposit rate) 
 na 9.81 7.98 7.98 12.48 
Market capitalization (% of GDP) 
 - 35.17 - 5.51 23.69 
Listed domestic companies, total 
 - 55 - 11 8 
Sources: World Bank (2012): World Development Indicators (Edition: April 2012); Finscope (2010); 
Central banks.  
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Table 4: EAC banking system indicators (2003-2010) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average
Return on assets (%) 
Burundi 1.52 1.35 1.43 1.53 1.79 1.88 2.01 1.78 1.66 
Kenya 1.65 1.74 2.18 2.34 2.72 3.02 3.14 3.28 2.51 
Rwanda 2.55 1.35 1.13 0.96 1.26 2.11 1.93 1.81 1.64 
Tanzania 1.71 2.27 2.96 3.74 4.39 4.48 4.19 3.47 3.40 
Uganda 4.31 3.98 3.88 3.75 3.46 3.59 3.52 3.09 3.70 
Capital adequacy ratio (%) 
Burundi 15.08 14.80 18.29 15.50 14.10 14.68 17.88 18.80 16.14 
Kenya 17.59 16.84 16.43 17.03 17.70 18.67 19.68 19.50 17.93 
Rwanda 9.00 10.60 9.58 11.39 8.16 11.53 19.61 19.50 12.42 
Tanzania 21.00 21.20 16.38 17.43 17.59 16.98 19.54 20.52 18.83 
Uganda 20.89 18.93 18.86 18.66 19.31 20.15 21.66 21.45 19.99 
Equity to total assets ratio (%) 
Burundi 9.96 9.31 8.89 9.29 9.13 9.08 11.03 12.18 9.86 
Kenya 11.77 11.36 11.89 11.73 11.64 12.30 13.07 12.85 12.08 
Rwanda 8.70 9.00 8.65 9.15 9.78 10.93 13.95 12.43 10.32 
Tanzania 9.90 10.20 7.65 7.87 8.78 9.46 11.22 11.84 9.62 
Uganda 9.79 10.06 9.86 11.02 11.02 12.28 13.63 14.65 11.54 
Non performing loans to gross loans (%) 
Burundi 17.65 20.69 19.85 20.19 18.85 16.25 14.36 11.33 17.40 
Kenya 35.78 23.88 26.15 22.07 14.39 9.39 8.51 7.14 18.41 
Rwanda 8.70 9.00 8.65 9.15 9.78 12.61 13.48 12.10 10.43 
Tanzania 4.50 4.40 5.00 6.52 7.40 6.35 7.00 7.07 6.03 
Uganda 6.60 3.25 2.64 2.74 3.60 3.48 3.44 2.90 3.58 
Aggregate Z-score 
Burundi 75.46 36.17 23.99 22.63 107.81 45.78 57.72 21.18 48.84 
Kenya 21.31 20.27 79.03 37.92 35.94 55.09 177.48 63.99 61.38 
Rwanda 17.09 9.33 11.73 17.78 20.55 12.51 11.77 11.60 14.05 
Tanzania 24.49 20.81 13.69 15.86 25.78 38.96 21.61 19.35 22.57 
Uganda 11.95 21.03 16.82 16.63 35.24 68.09 54.58 35.20 32.44 
Sources: East African Community Statistics (2012). 
Aggregate Z-scores are calculated as Z=(ROA+EQTA)/SDROA, where ROA and EQTA are three year 
rolling means of the return on assets and the equity to total assets ratio, and SDROA is the three year 
rolling standard deviation of the return on assets. Higher aggregate Z-scores reflect lower levels of 
aggregate bank insolvency risk. 
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Table 5: EAC banking regulation (2010) 
 Burundi Kenya Rwanda Tanzania Uganda 
Explicit deposit insurance system 
 No Yes No Yes Yes 
Required capital adequacy ratio (%) 
Total 8 12 15 12 12 
Core Tier 1 - 8 10 10 8 
Activity restriction 
Securities activities Unrestricted Restricted Unrestricted Unrestricted Restricted 
Insurance activities Prohibited Prohibited Unrestricted Permitted Prohibited 
Real estate activities Restricted Permitted Permitted Permitted Permitted 
Supervisory power to declare insolvency of a bank 
 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sources: World Bank (2012): Bank Regulation and Supervision Database; Central banks. 
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Table 6: Willingness to participate in monetary union: Monetary stability motives 
Proxy 1 : Inverse of (realized) inflation rate 
All EAC member countries Original EAC member countries 
  No Uncertainty Uncertainty  No Uncertainty Uncertainty 
Country Ratio (2010) Join MU?  Trigger ratio Join MU?  Ratio (2010) Join MU?  Trigger ratio Join MU?  
Burundi 1.52 Yes  2.82 No 0.85       
Rwanda 0.54 No 0.86 1.70 No 2.16       
Kenya 0.96 No 0.05 1.59 No 0.66 0.91 No 0.10 1.61 No 0.77
Tanzania 1.29 Yes  1.96 No 0.52 1.22 Yes  1.93 No 0.58
Uganda 0.94 No 0.07 1.77 No 0.89 0.89 No 0.13 1.75 No 0.97
Proxy 2 : Inverse of Public Domestic Debt to GDP ratio 
All EAC member countries Original EAC member countries 
  No Uncertainty Uncertainty  No Uncertainty Uncertainty 
Country Ratio (2010) Join MU?  Trigger ratio Join MU?  Ratio (2010) Join MU?  Trigger ratio Join MU?  
Burundi 3.29 Yes  2.08 Yes        
Rwanda 0.96 No 0.04 1.73 No 0.80       
Kenya 4.02 Yes  1.84 Yes  4.81 Yes  1.88 Yes  
Tanzania 1.43 Yes  1.81 No 0.26 1.71 Yes  1.84 No 0.07
Uganda 0.38 No 1.64 1.33 No 2.53 0.45 No 1.21 1.31 No 1.90
 
Sources: EAC Statistics database, central banks’ reports, IMF’s IFS and World Bank’s WDI. Period: 2003-2010. Values for trigger ratios (u*c*)  
and the minimum level of relative other benefits  associated with being in a monetary union that makes joining the monetary union worthwhile 
are derived from Proposition 1, assuming discount rate =12% and concavity factor =0.5. 
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Table 7: Willingness to participate in monetary union: Financial stability motives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: EAC Statistics database, central banks’ reports, IMF’s IFS and World Bank’s WDI. Period: 2003-2010. Values for trigger ratios (u*c*)  
and the minimum level of relative other benefits  associated with being in a monetary union that makes joining the monetary union worthwhile 
are derived from Proposition 1, assuming discount rate =12% and concavity factor =0.5. 
 
Proxy 1 : Inverse of Bank Nonperforming Loans to Gross Loans ratio 
All EAC member countries Original EAC member countries 
  No Uncertainty Uncertainty  No Uncertainty Uncertainty 
Country Ratio (2010) Join MU?  Trigger ratio Join MU?  Ratio (2010) Join MU?  Trigger ratio Join MU?  
Burundi 1.87 Yes  1.53 Yes        
Rwanda 1.99 Yes  1.58 Yes        
Kenya 1.18 Yes  1.43 No 0.21 1.20 Yes  1.19 No 0.20
Tanzania 1.16 Yes  1.12 Yes  1.18 Yes  7.18 Yes  
Uganda 0.48 No 1.09 1.54 No 2.23 0.49 No 1.06 5.34 No 2.14
Proxy 2 : Aggregate Z-score measures 
All EAC member countries Original EAC member countries 
  No Uncertainty Uncertainty  No Uncertainty Uncertainty 
Country Ratio (2010) Join MU?  Trigger ratio Join MU?  Ratio (2010) Join MU?  Trigger ratio Join MU?  
Burundi 2.25 Yes  4.05 No 0.80       
Rwanda 4.10 Yes  5.88 No 0.43       
Kenya 0.74 No 0.34 1.22 No 0.64 0.76 No 0.31 1.19 No 0.56
Tanzania 2.46 Yes  6.80 No 1.77 2.52 Yes  7.18 No 1.85
Uganda 1.35 Yes  5.12 No 2.78 1.38 Yes  5.34 No 2.86
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Table 8: Willingness to participate in monetary union: Fiscal stability motives 
Proxy 1 : Inverse of budget deficit (incl. grants) to GDP ratio 
All EAC member countries Original EAC member countries 
  No Uncertainty Uncertainty  No Uncertainty Uncertainty 
Country Ratio (2010) Join MU?  Trigger ratio Join MU?  Ratio (2010) Join MU?  Trigger ratio Join MU?  
Burundi 0.89 No 0.13 1.33 No 0.50       
Rwanda 0.81 No 0.23 1.36 No 0.68       
Kenya 1.07 Yes  1.24 No 0.16 1.05 Yes  1.25 No 0.20
Tanzania 0.96 No 0.04 1.28 No 0.33 0.95 No 0.06 1.26 No 0.33
Uganda 1.04 Yes  1.26 No 0.21 1.02 Yes  1.29 No 0.26
Proxy 2 : Inverse of budget deficit (excl. grants) to GDP ratio 
All EAC member countries Original EAC member countries 
  No Uncertainty Uncertainty  No Uncertainty Uncertainty 
Country Ratio (2010) Join MU?  Trigger ratio Join MU?  Ratio (2010) Join MU?  Trigger ratio Join MU?  
Burundi 1.34 Yes  1.36 No 0.02       
Rwanda 1.24 Yes  1.19 Yes        
Kenya 0.98 No 0.02 1.16 No 0.18 0.99 No 0.01 2.28 No 1.28
Tanzania 1.01 Yes  1.23 No 0.21 1.03 Yes  2.14 No 1.08
Uganda 0.93 No 0.07 1.18 No 0.26 0.96 No 0.06 2.06 No 1.15
 
Sources: EAC Statistics database, central banks’ reports, IMF’s IFS and World Bank’s WDI. Period: 2003-2010. Values for trigger ratios (u*c*)  
and the minimum level of relative other benefits  associated with being in a monetary union that makes joining the monetary union worthwhile 
are derived from Proposition 1, assuming discount rate =12% and concavity factor =0.5. 
 
 
